We examine signed volume for a sample of 1,039 newly-listed options on the Chicago Board Options Exchange between 1980 and 1997, in order to test whether option introduction represents an economically important reduction in short sale constraints. To the extent that option listing relaxes a binding constraint, we would expect to see investors taking significant bearish positions in the newly-listed options. Contrary to this hypothesis, we find that the volume of newly-listed options tends to be very low, and, if anything, more bullish that bearish during the first week of trading. Abnormal stock returns surrounding option listing are unrelated to signed option volume in the first few days after listing, suggesting that any negative stock reaction to option listing is unlikely to be the result of synthetic short selling. We also find that prior results in the literature reporting a negative price reaction surrounding option listing are not robust to alternative methodological assumptions. In summary, we find no evidence from option markets that a marginal change in the cost of short selling can have an impact on prices. 1
Introduction
In the wake of the large declines in stock prices following the "internet bubble," there has been a flurry of interest in the idea that short sale constraints may cause stocks to be mispriced.
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In its simplest incarnation, the argument is that short-sale constraints make it more difficult for those with a negative opinion of the stock to trade on their beliefs, and this might cause prices to be too high. This basic argument, formalized by Miller (1977) , can be traced back to John Burr
Williams (1938) . In a world where traders have rational expectations and prices aggregate information, the equilibrium price should still reflect the correct value (see Diamond and Verrechhia, 1987) . But if traders are overconfident, or for some other reason traders in equilibrium "agree to disagree," the differential costs of taking long and short positions may cause distortions in market prices that cannot be arbitraged away.
Several authors have argued that the introduction of traded options represents an economically important relaxation of short-sale constraints. 2 These authors suggest that option markets lower the costs of short selling in various ways. For example, they permit investors to take levered short positions without having to find a lender for the stock, post a large margin, or trade on an "uptick." The essence of the argument is that options facilitate short selling by enabling investors with negative information about the stock to take synthetic short positions in the option market. Presumably, the opposite side of the position is taken by option market makers who face fewer constraints than the investor, and who turn around and hedge by short selling the stock. In support of this hypothesis, Figlewski and Webb (1993) report evidence that 1 See the recent review by Rubinstein (2004) . Among the many recent studies on this topic are the theoretical contributions of Hong and Stein (2003) , Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) , Duffie, Garleanu, and Pederson (2002) , and Sheinkman and Xiong (2003) , and empirical studies by Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) , Jones and Lamont (2002) , Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) , and Chen and Singal (2003) . 2 See Figlewski and Webb (1993) , and Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) .
short interest in the underlying stock increases surrounding the option introduction. Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2003) describe some of the institutional reasons why option market makers face fewer short selling constraints than ordinary investors.
If the high costs of short selling cause stocks to be overpriced and if options lower the costs of shorting, we might expect to see stock prices decline when options are introduced. Thus, one can test whether options alleviate overpricing due to short-sale constraints by testing whether option listing negatively affects the price of the underlying stock.
On this question, the empirical evidence is mixed. Branch and Finnerty (1981), Conrad (1989) , and others have documented a positive price effect associated with option listing, using data on U.S. option listings in the 1970s. The international evidence, reported by Stucki and Wasserfallen (1994) , Faff and Hillier (2002) , and others, also suggests that stock prices increase around option listing. However, Ho and Liu (1997) and Sorescu (2000) report negative abnormal returns surrounding the introduction of options in the U.S. after 1980. Furthermore, Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) have found these returns to be related to measures of dispersion of beliefs. These authors argue that non-optioned stocks tend to be overvalued on average, and that option listing lowers the costs of shorting, and thus causes prices to decline.
These results, to the extent that they are accurate and robust, have important implications.
If stock prices respond immediately to marginal changes in the costs of short selling, this is an empirical validation that short sale constraints matter. And if option listing affects stock prices, then so might other changes that affect the costs of short selling, such as changing the margin requirement, or a change in the uptick rule. However, the robustness of these results is a matter of concern, given that a number of studies have found the opposite result in different samples.
In this paper, we take a new approach to investigating whether the introduction of options represents an economically significant relaxation of short-sale constraints. Specifically, we examine the signed trading volume of newly-listed options. If option listing depresses stock prices by inducing pessimistic investors to trade, then we would expect to see an economically significant amount of synthetic shorting in the new options immediately after they are listed.
That is, we would expect to see buyer-initiated trades in put options, and/or seller-initiated trades in call options. If the negative returns surrounding option listing are actually caused by the option listing, we would also expect to see a positive cross-sectional relation between signed option trading volume and the abnormal return around option listing.
All of our evidence contradicts this hypothesis. Based on analysis of transaction-level data for 1,039 options listed on the CBOE between June 1980 and January 1997, we find that the trading volume on newly-listed options tends to be very low. On the introduction date, and each of the subsequent five trading days, "bearish" trading volume on the CBOE was ten contracts or less for more than half the options in our sample. It is hard to imagine that such a small trading volume could have an appreciable effect on the underlying stock price. Indeed, for a significant proportion of our sample, bearish trading volume was zero over the first two trading days, and in some cases over the first six trading days. For these subsamples, we find the abnormal return surrounding option introduction to be just as negative as for the sample as a whole.
We find no evidence that bearish trading volume is abnormally high on the introduction date or any of the subsequent five trading days. If anything, the opposite it true. In the period immediately following listing, the proportion of total volume classified as bearish tends to be slightly lower than its long-run mean, and lower than the proportion classified as bullish.
Moreover, in a cross-sectional regression analysis, we find that net bullish option volume has very little power to explain abnormal returns, and that the regression coefficient is negative, contrary to what we would expect if the abnormal return around option listing is being driven by option trading.
Our evidence suggests that option initiation does not represent an economically important relaxation of short-selling constraints. What, then, is driving the results reported in the literature that in the U.S. after 1980, stock prices respond negatively to option introduction? To address this question, we investigate the robustness of this result to alternative methodological assumptions. Using the methodology of Mayhew and Mihov (2004a), we construct a control sample of non-optioned stocks that had similar characteristics as those that were selected for listing, and find significant negative abnormal returns for the control sample that are similar in magnitude to (and statistically indistinguishable from) the effect observed in the original sample.
This suggests that the observed relation between option listing and negative stock returns is probably spurious.
Moreover, if option listing affects prices by allowing short sellers to access the market more cheaply, we would expect most of the price reaction to occur on the introduction date, or perhaps on the day or two following introduction. The negative abnormal returns reported by Sorescu (2000) are based on an eleven-day event window, which includes five days before and after listing. The three most significant days contributing to the negative returns are days +5, -3, and -1, with virtually no abnormal return on day zero. In contrast, for the positive returns around option listings in the 1970s, documented by Conrad (1989) , the biggest abnormal return occurs on day zero.
We also show that the finding of a negative price reaction to option listing is sensitive to the risk model employed to measure abnormal returns. Sorescu's (2000) results employ an estimate of beta that is based on returns from day -100 to day -6. We find that the statistical and economic significance of this result disappears if the market model is estimated over a window straddling the event, the methodology used by Conrad (1989) . The average raw return on optioned stocks is actually positive on the listing date, and positive or indistinguishable from zero on every other day in the 11-day event window. The negative market-model returns predominantly represent underperformance on days when the market is going up, rather than actual negative returns. Thus, traders who may have used the newly-listed options as an alternative venue for short selling would not have made money from the strategy, unless they were hedged against market movements.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 2, we summarize the existing literature on the effects of short-sale constraints, the relation between options and shortsale constraints, and the price effects of option listing. In section 3, we describe our data. In section 4, we present our analysis of the trading volume of newly-listed options. In section 5, we investigate the robustness of the price effect. We conclude the paper in section 6. With respect to the asymmetry between the effects of good and bad news, Reed (2002) documents that the stock price reaction to negative earnings surprises is larger when the stock is hard to borrow. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2003) analyze the effects of short sale restrictions in a sample of 47 equity markets around the world. They find evidence suggesting that short selling facilitates price discovery, and that short sale restrictions can affect the skewness of the returns distribution.
Literature Review

Effects of Short Sale Constraints
Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) analyze the effect of borrowing costs on various apparent arbitrage strategies involving short selling. Mitchell and Pulvino (2002) and Lamont and Thaler (2003) examine the extent to which short sale constraints make it impossible to implement arbitrage in cases, such as the famous "Palm" case, where the total market value of a firm's equity is lower than the market value of the shares it holds in a publicly-traded subsidiary. 
Relation between Short Sale Constraints and Options
Various authors have examined aspects of the relation between options and short sale constraints. Figlewski and Webb (1993) report that optioned stocks tend to have higher short interest than non-optioned stocks, and that short interest tends to increase with option listing, suggesting that option markets facilitate short selling. One might be tempted to surmise that by providing an alternate venue for shorting, option markets will attract short volume away from the stock market. But this ignores the fact that on the other side of the option position is a financial intermediary (generally, an option market maker), who will typically seek to hedge long exposure by shorting the underlying stock. For various reasons, option market makers face lower short selling costs than individual investors (see Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed, 2003) . Thus, option markets facilitate short selling by allowing the lowest-cost trader to establish the short position in the underlying market. On the other hand, evidence reported by Mayhew and Mihov (2004b) suggests that the observed relation between option listing and increases in short interest may be spurious, as a similar pattern is observed in a control sample of non-optioned stocks.
Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2002) find that violations of put-call parity tend to be asymmetric, in the direction of short sale constraints. In other words, the put is more likely to be overpriced relative to the call than vice-versa, because in the former case, the arbitrage would require costly short selling. Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2003) also document violations of put-call parity for hard-to-borrow stocks.
A number of authors find that options help make markets informationally efficient.
Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998) find an improvement in informational efficiency after option listing. Jennings and Starks (1986) find evidence that stock prices adjust more quickly to earnings announcements if there is a listed option, and Skinner (1990) finds the information content of earnings announcements to be lower after option introduction. In contrast, Reed One contribution of the current paper is to explore the robustness of the finding that abnormal returns are negative around options listings post-1980. We focus on Sorescu's (2000) results, as his is the most comprehensive sample on which the price effect of option listing has been studied. Sorescu studies a sample of 2,051 stocks listed for optioning during 1973-1995.
His benchmark measure is the average cumulative abnormal returns calculated during an 11-day window, [-5,+5] 
Data
Our analysis of trading volume is based on transaction-level data on 1,039 classes that were listed on the CBOE between June, 1980 and January, 1997, as reported in the Berkeley Options Data Base. Individual trades were signed as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated using the algorithm suggested by Lee and Ready (1991) . Savickas and Wilson (2003) provide evidence that this algorithm is fairly accurate at signing trades in the option market. Using a proprietary CBOE data set that reports trade direction, they find that the correct classification rate for the Lee-Ready rule is above 80%. 4 We exclude ADRs and country funds from our sample, since they in turn are based on other underlying securities traded outside of the U.S. Further, we require that the sample stocks have data available on share price, stock returns, and trading volume for one calendar year before the event, which brings the final sample of selected stocks to 2,166 listings.
Using the methodology of Mayhew and Mihov (2004a), we construct a matched sample of non-optioned stocks that had similar characteristics as those that were selected for listing.
Specifically, we use a logit model of the probability of listing as a function of long-term (250 trading days prior to listing) underlying trading volume and volatility, short-term volume and volatility (30 days prior to listing), and the market capitalization of the firm in constant 1996
dollars. The logit model is estimated based on the observed listing decisions by the exchanges, out of the universe of all stocks that met or exceeded the listing eligibility criteria and were not currently optioned. We roll through the data and estimate ex-ante probabilities of option listing for each eligible stock each month. We then construct a control sample of stocks that were not selected for option listing, but were the most likely (in terms of predicted probability) of being selected. The control sample is composed of 2,166 stock/dates, matched in time to the 2,166 actual listing events.
Trading Volume of Newly Listed Options
This section presents our main results of our analysis of trading volume for options in the first few days after listing. We focus on the listing date and the subsequent five days, because
Sorescu (2000) documents negative abnormal returns within five days of listing. If the negative returns were associated with an effective relaxation of short-sale constraints, we would expect to see synthetic shorting in the options market sometime during the event window. Table 1 reports the mean and median total option volume, bullish volume, and bearish volume, across all the classes in our sample, for the listing date and the next five trading days.
The most striking thing about the numbers is that the trading volume in all categories is very low.
On the listing date, the mean trading volume is only 173 contracts, with a median of only 40 contracts, and is even lower than this on each of the five subsequent trading days. These numbers reflect bullish, bearish, and neutral trades, lumped together. Bearish volume hovers between 42 and 61 contracts for the mean, and is stable around 10 contracts for the median. An option position of 10 contracts corresponds to options on 1,000 shares. We do not calculate the deltaequivalent stock position, but it must be less than 1,000 shares. Using the rule of thumb that deltas for at-the-money options are somewhere near .5, and most volume is near the money, the median bearish volume corresponds to about 500 shares of stock.
We would expect that a volume of this magnitude would not have an appreciable impact on the equilibrium stock price. In Panels B and C of table 1 we present the ratios of options volume relative to the contemporaneous underlying stock volume, and the number of shares outstanding, respectively. Over the first six days after introduction, measured as a proportion of the trading volume in the underlying stock, the median bearish option volume represents one percent of the stock volume, and less than one-tenth of one percent of the outstanding shares, before adjusting for delta. Research on the price impact of trades by Kraus and Stoll (1972) , Chan and Lakonishok (1995) , Keim and Madhavan (1996) , and others indicates that trades of this magnitude should have a trivial impact on the underlying stock price, much smaller than the 1.7% negative abnormal return reported by Sorescu (2000). Again, we focus on the first six trading days after listing because this is the window over which Sorescu (2000) reports negative abnormal returns. It is possible that traders might take longer than six days to react to a new option listing. However, we find no evidence of abnormal bearish trading volume any time during the first 100 days after listing. Figure 1 graphically depicts the mean bearish and bullish volume for the first 100 days after listing. Trading volume gradually increases over time, but the mix between bearish and bullish volume remains about even. Bearish volume and bullish volume each hover around 40% to 45% of total options volume over the first 100 days. If there is anything unusual about the first two weeks of trading, it is that the proportion of bearish volume is slightly lower. This can be seen in figure 2, which shows 5 For example, the marginal effect on price of volume equal to $1 million worth of shares is -0.13% in Kraus and Stoll. In Keim and Madhavan, a trading volume of about 1% of shares outstanding would be required to move the price by -2.0%. Bearish volume after option listing is many times lower than what would those models require to generate the negative price reaction of -1.7%. Even if the total options volume were entirely bearish, it still falls significantly short of the quantity needed to generate a price effect of that magnitude. This suggests that our conclusion is not sensitive to mistakes that may arise due to the misclassification of trades.
Bearish and Bullish volume, as a proportion of total volume, for the first 40 days. This is exactly
the opposite of what we would expect if previously disenfranchised traders use newly-listed options to short the stock synthetically.
Thus far, we have presented evidence that the average trading volume on newly-listed options is low, and is not disproportionately weighted toward bearish volume. Conceivably, the observed negative returns might be driven by a small number of tail events that are washed out in the average. If this were true, we would expect to see no abnormal return for the subsample with zero bearish volume, and the largest abnormal returns for the subsample with the highest bearish volume. To investigate this, we examine those listings for which we have volume data, and for which sufficient data are available from CRSP to compute daily abnormal returns over an 11-day event window. The results are presented in Table 2 .
We find no evidence linking negative abnormal returns around option listing to signed option volume. As reported in Panel A of Table 2 , across the sample of 697 listings for which both volume and abnormal return data are available, the mean abnormal return was approximately -2.4% in the 11-day window surrounding option listing 6 . For the subset of 218 options that had zero bearish volume on the first trading day, the mean abnormal return was -2.1%. For the subset of 129 options with no bearish trading volume on the first two days, the mean abnormal return was -2.7%, and for the 37 options with no bearish trading volume on the first six trading days, the mean abnormal return was -2.4%. For all three subsamples, the mean abnormal return is statistically indistinguishable from the entire sample.
Also in Panel A of Table 2 , we report the average CAR for ten subsamples, formed by dividing the stocks into deciles according to their net bullish volume. Net bullish volume is measured as total bullish volume minus total bearish volume over the first six trading days, scaled by dividing by the contemporaneous trading volume in the underlying stock, so that the stocks in the lower deciles are those with more bearish volume. For stocks in the lowest two deciles, the mean CAR was -0.98% and -0.38%, significantly less negative than the rest of the sample. Thus, for the subset of stocks most likely to be impacted by bearish option volume, the abnormal return was among the highest in the sample, and not significantly different from zero Next, we use regression analysis to further investigate the cross-sectional relation between event-window abnormal returns and signed option volume. These results are reported in Panel B of Table 2 . Regressing the cumulative abnormal return over an 11-day event window on net bullish volume, net bullish volume scaled over underlying stock volume, or just bullish volume without any adjustments, we find that the coefficient is negative but not different from zero, and the adjusted R-square is less than 0.01. Conversely, the coefficient on bearish volume is positive, and in some specifications significant at 5%, but in most, not significant. Thus, we see that signed trading volume has virtually no power to explain abnormal returns, and if there is any effect, it is in the opposite direction as would be predicted by the hypothesis that pressure from option trading influences the stock price. We tested the robustness of this result by repeating the analysis using various scaled measures of bearish volume and various event windows. In all specifications, the sign on net bullish volume remained negative, and none of the specifications had much explanatory power, as measured by R-squared.
Robustness of Event Study Methodology
Recall that Conrad (1989) and others report finding a positive price effect in response to option listing in the earlier years, while Sorescu (2000) finds a negative price effect since 1981.
Our evidence suggests that option initiation does not represent an economically important relaxation of short-selling constraints. What, then, is driving the result that stock prices respond negatively to option introduction? To address this question, we investigate the robustness of this result to alternative methodological assumptions. Our initial tests are based on the same version of the Brown-Warner event-study methodology that Sorescu (2000) uses. Our approach is to replicate the existing results as closely as possible, and then examine whether they are robust to three alternative specifications: 1) using the control sample methodology of Mayhew and Mihov (2004a) , 2) varying the market model estimation period, and 3) varying the event window.
We were able to replicate closely the results reported by Sorescu (2000) . Following the methodology used in his study, we estimate the market model parameters over the period trading day -100 to trading day -6 relative to the listing, and then calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARS) over an eleven-day event window surrounding option listing, from day -5 to day +5. We use the CRSP value-weighted index as a proxy for the market. We group listings occurring on the same day. Thus, our sample consists of 2,166 listings grouped into 983 events.
Among these, 262 listings grouped into 84 events occur between 1973 and 1980, and 1,904 listings in 899 groups occur between 1981 and 1996. Results are reported in column (i) of Table   3 . Also reported are t-statistics for the null hypothesis that that the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) are equal to zero. Because of the data requirements that we impose, our sample is slightly different from that used by Sorescu (2000) , and the coefficients are not identical. Nevertheless, our results very closely replicate his results overall, and across event days, both in terms of the magnitude and the significance of the ACARs. We were also able to replicate his results for yearly subperiods (results not reported). We replicate Sorescu's result that the ACARs tend to be significantly positive prior to 1981 and negative since 1981.
However, we find similar results in a control sample of stocks that were not selected for option listing. These results are reported in column (ii) of Table 3 . Using the methodology of Mayhew and Mihov (2004a), we identified a control sample of stocks with similar characteristics to those that were selected for listing, and we document that the overall Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) over the [-5,+5] window are also significant and negative, and virtually indistinguishable from those in the original sample. While the stocks that were optioned experienced a mean cumulative abnormal return of -1.47%, the matched sample experienced mean negative cumulative abnormal return of -1.62%. For the period 1981-96, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal means for the CAR between the selected sample and the control sample.
We also form arbitrage pairs with positive weight on the selected stocks and negative weight on the matched stocks, where all listings occurring on the same date are grouped into portfolios. We find that the arbitrage portfolios, i.e., buying the selected stocks and shorting the matched ones, generate a mean CAR of 0.06% over the [-5 ,+5] interval, statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results are reported in Table 3 , column (iii). The returns on the arbitrage pairs are statistically indistinguishable from zero over for shorter windows as well, such as [-3, +3] and [-1, +1 ].
The control sample we used for columns (ii) and (iii) in Table 3 includes the nonoptioned stocks that had the highest predicted probability of listing, based on a logit model calibrated to the observed listing data. We repeated this exercise using an alternative measure that identifies the non-optioned stocks having the closest predicted probabilities to the selected stocks. For this control sample, the mean cumulative abnormal return was -0.96% for the 11-day window and -0.14% for the 3-day window, and the returns on the arbitrage portfolio were again indistinguishable from zero. We also repeated the exercise using a control sample that matched firms based solely on size. For the size-matched control sample, the mean cumulative abnormal return was -0.43% for the eleven-day window and -0.13% for the three-day window, and the returns on the arbitrage portfolio were negative. Essentially, the significance of the negative abnormal returns disappears when compared to either of the two logit-based control samples, and is lessened but does not disappear when compared to a size-based control sample.
Next, we apply Conrad's (1989) methodology for estimating the market model parameters over both sides of the event, and find that the apparent negative price effect disappears in the post-1981 sample 7 . These results are reported in column (iv) of Table 3 . Over the [-5, +5] window, the ACAR is -0.3% with a t-value of -0.72, statistically indistinguishable from zero. The result is even more strongly pronounced for shorter event windows; for example, over the [-1, +1] window, the ACAR is -0.04% with a t-value of -0.19. Table 4 reports average raw returns, market returns, and both measures of market-model abnormal returns, separately for each day in the event window, and separately for the 1973-80 sample and the 1981-96 sample. Note that in the post-1981 sample, the average raw return is positive on the event date (with a t-value of 2.25), and positive or statistically indistinguishable from zero on every day in the event window. This means that the negative market model returns are driven by the market adjustment, not the returns. The stock prices increased, but by less than they were expected to given the market movement. If traders were attempting to synthetically short the stock by trading the newly-listed options, it appears that their profits from the negative idiosyncratic return would have been more than offset by the positive market return, unless they were hedging out the market risk.
Note also that in the 1981-1996 sample, the apparent negative abnormal returns are sensitive to the event window choice. Examining the daily abnormal returns in table 4, we find that in the post-1981 period, the largest negative single-day abnormal returns occur on day +5, followed by day -3 and day -1. More strikingly, the abnormal return occurring on the actual listing day is virtually zero. Thus, varying the window size from three to seven to eleven days affects strongly the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal return, and also the strength of the statistical significance.
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Each of these three robustness tests, on its own, calls into question the validity of the negative price effect associated with option listing after 1980. Together, these results suggest that the negative price effect since 1981 appears to be, at best, significantly less pronounced than previously reported in the literature, and most likely non-existent.
In contrast, none of these three alternative tests contradict Conrad's (1989) It is natural to expect that option listing should lower the cost of shorting. If the costs of short selling represent a binding constraint that keeps prices artificially high, then we would expect to see a significant amount of trading immediately after the constraint is relaxed.
Specifically, we would expect to see a nontrivial amount of synthetic shorting, or "bearish" option volume, in the days following listing.
Our evidence suggests that this is simply not the case. Option volume tends to be quite low in the first few days after listing, and is roughly symmetric across bearish and bullish volume. If anything, trading in the first few days is slightly skewed toward bullish volume in the first few days of trading. We conclude that either the introduction of options does not significantly lower the costs of short selling, or else short selling costs do not represent an economically meaningful binding constraint, at least not for the type of stocks that have options listed.
Strengthening this conclusion, we find that the apparent negative returns around option listing are just as negative when there is no bearish trading volume at all in the option market.
Net bullish option volume explains almost none of the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns, nor is there any robust, statistically significant relation between abnormal returns and signed option volume. If anything, there is weak evidence supporting a negative relation, suggesting that more bearish option volume corresponds to higher stock returns.
Finally, we present evidence that the negative returns and increases in short interest and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , who find that hedge funds were not trying to short technology stocks during the bubble. If stocks were overvalued at this time, it does not appear to be a consequence of short sale constraints. In summary, we now believe that there is no credible evidence from option markets that a marginal change in the cost of short selling can have an impact on prices. (1985) methodology, where the market model is estimated over days [-100, -6] . Column (ii) reports ACARs for the same methodology applied to a matched sample of non-optioned stocks that had similar characteristics as those that were selected for listing, using the matching procedure of Mayhew and Mihov (2004a) . Column (iii) reports ACARs for arbitrage pairs with positive weight on the selected stocks and negative weight on the matched stocks, where all listings occurring on the same date are grouped into portfolios. Column (iv) reports ACARs for optioned stocks when the market beta is estimated over a window split around the listing date, [(-54,-6) (+6, +54)]. In parentheses, we report the t-statistics for test of the null hypothesis that the ACARs are equal to zero. In all cases, the market is approximated by the CRSP value-weighted index; and listings occurring on the same date are grouped into portfolios, resulting in 1,904 listing grouped into 899 events.
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (N = 1,904 listings on 899 dates) The symbols*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
